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Parsing Privilege: Does the
Attorney–Client Privilege
Attach to an Angry Client’s
Criminal Threat Voiced During
an Otherwise Privileged
Attorney–Client Consultation?
Edward J. Imwinkelried†
“Lawyers tend to pay far too little attention to the feelings of their
clients. Typically, lawyers . . . see themselves solely as ‘gatherers
of facts.’ . . . [F]eelings are perceived as irrelevant or objects to
be removed from the discussion. . . . [However,] empathy, the real
mortar of any relationship, requires hearing, understanding, and
acceptance of feelings which are part and parcel of any
situation. . . . [T]he problems people bring to lawyers do not come
in nice, neat, rational packages devoid of . . . emotional content.
Problems evoke feelings and any solutions which the lawyer
fashions must effectively deal with feelings.”
—David A. Binder & Susan C. Price, Legal Interviewing and
Counseling: A Client-Centered Approach 25–26 (1977)
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Introduction
Privilege doctrine is an especially important area of evidence law.
Most evidentiary doctrines, such as authentication and the hearsay rule,
deal with the courts’ institutional policy of ensuring the reliability of
the evidence that findings of fact are based on.1 In contrast, privilege
law rests on extrinsic social policy.2 During the 1973 hearings on the
then-proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, former Supreme Court
Justice Arthur Goldberg distinguished privilege doctrine from other
evidentiary rules:
[Privilege law] is the concern of the public at large. . . .
[Privileges] involve the relations between husband and wife. As
the Supreme Court suggested in Griswold v. Connecticut [381
U.S. 479 (1965),] the marital privilege constitutes the basis of the

1.

See T.P. Gallanis, The Rise of Modern Evidence Law, 84 Iowa L. Rev.
499, 501, 517–19 (1999).

2.

Edward J. Imwinkelried, 2 The New Wigmore: A Treatise on
Evidence: Evidentiary Privileges § 4.1 (4th ed. 2021), Westlaw
(database updated 2021).
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family relation and antedates even the adoption of our Constitution. They involve the relations between lawyer and client, a
privilege that long antedates the adoption of our Constitution.
....
. . . They relate to the fundamental rights of citizens.3

In the final House report on the proposed rules, Representative
Elizabeth Holtzman remarked that “unlike most evidentiary rules,
privileges protect interpersonal relationships outside of the courtroom.”4
The Supreme Court hands down a relatively small number of decisions
each year, and understandably the Court endeavors to select cases that
have social significance and impact. Since the enactment of the Federal
Rules of Evidence, the Supreme Court has handed down more decisions
dealing with privileges than with any other part of the Federal Rules.5
In early 2021, the Supreme Court added to its body of privilege jurisprudence when it rendered its decision in U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service
v. Sierra Club, Inc.,6 dealing with the deliberative-process privilege.7
Although there are numerous privileges in contemporary American
law, the attorney–client doctrine was the first to be recognized in
English law.8 American courts have waxed poetic about the privilege.
They have described it as “sacrosanct,”9 “the most sacred of all legally

3.

Rules of Evidence, Spec. Subcomm. on Reform of Fed. Crim. L.,
Comm. on the Judiciary, 93 Cong. 143–44 (1973) (testimony of Hon.
Arthur H. Goldberg).

4.

Comm. on the Judiciary, Federal Rules of Evidence, H.R. Rep.
No. 93-650, at 28 (1973) (statement of Hon. Elizabeth Holtzman).

5.

Molly Rebecca Bryson, Note, Protecting Confidential Communications
Between a Psychotherapist and Patient: Jaffee v. Redmond, 46 Cath. U.
L. Rev. 963, 963 n.1 (1997) (citing Note, Making Sense of Rules of
Privilege Under the Structural (Il)Logic of the Federal Rules of Evidence,
105 Harv. L. Rev. 1339, 1339 (1992)).

6.

141 S. Ct. 777 (2021).

7.

Id. at 783.

8.

Imwinkelried, supra note 2, § 2.2; Gennusa v. Shoar, 879 F. Supp. 2d
1337, 1347 (M.D. Fla. 2012) (referring to attorney–client privilege as “the
oldest of the privileges for confidential communications known to the
common law.” (quoting Cox v. Adm’r U.S. Steel & Carnegie, 17 F.3d
1386, 1414 (11th Cir. 1994))), aff’d sub nom. Gennusa v. Canova, 748
F.3d 1103 (11th Cir. 2014); Pampered Chef v. Alexanian, 737 F. Supp. 2d
958, 963 (N.D. Ill. 2010) (same).

9.

Don R. Berthiaume, “Just the Facts”: Solving the Corporate Privilege
Waiver Dilemma, 46 Crim. L. Bull. 5, 15 & n.59 (2010) (suggesting that
the privilege is “venerated” and that “[o]ne simply has to Google the query
‘attorney client privilege is sacrosanct’ to see the number of commentators
who make this claim and to see that it is widely accepted”).
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recognized privileges,”10 and the “most fundamental of the common law
privileges.”11 If the privilege claimant can establish the necessary prima
facie case—that a holder is asserting the privilege for a confidential
communication not only between attorney and client but also incident
to the relation12—the privilege is “absolute.”13 The opponent cannot
defeat the prima facie case by making an ad hoc showing of a compelling
need for the information; rather, the privilege can be defeated only by
showing a waiver by the holder or the applicability of an exception to
the scope of the privilege.14
Given the long history of the attorney–client privilege, it is
surprising that one of the most fundamental questions relating to the
privilege has received little attention: the unit of analysis for a confidential “communication.” Suppose that a privilege claimant can show that
the primary purpose15 for an attorney–client exchange was facilitating
the rendition of legal services by the attorney to the client. If the exchange took the form of a writing such as a letter from the client to the
attorney, does the privilege automatically protect the entirety of the
letter? If the exchange was oral, does the privilege shield every statement made by the client during the consultation? Or does the judge
have the power to “parse” privilege, that is, to review the writing or
oral exchange line by line,16 separately apply the privilege’s requirements to each sentence or clause, and treat discrete passages as unprivileged?
10.

In re Grand Jury Proceedings Grand Jury No. 97-11-8, 162 F.3d 554, 556
(9th Cir. 1998) (quoting United States v. Bauer, 132 F.3d 504, 510 (9th
Cir. 1997)).

11.

In re Grand Jury Investigation, 810 F.3d 1110, 1113 (9th Cir. 2016) (quoting
In re Napster, Inc. Copyright Litig., 479 F.3d 1078, 1090 (9th Cir. 2007)).

12.

See 1 Kenneth S. Broun, George E. Dix, Edward J. Imwinkelried,
David H. Kaye & Eleanor Swift, McCormick on Evidence § 89,
at 628–30 (Robert P Mosteller ed., 8th ed. 2020) [hereinafter McCormick
on Evidence] (explaining that the attorney–client privilege protects attorney
communications that would tend to reveal client confidences).

13.

See Admiral Ins. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for the Dist. of Ariz., 881 F.2d
1486, 1491 (9th Cir. 1989); Mine Safety Appliances Co. v. N. River Ins.
Co., 73 F. Supp. 3d 544, 571 (W.D. Pa. 2014) (stating that “the attorney–
client privilege is an absolute privilege . . . .” (quoting Muller v. Nationwide
Mut. Ins. Co., 31 Pa. D. & C. 4th 23, 31 (Ct. Com. Pl. 1996))).

14.

Imwinkelried, supra note 2, § 3.2.4.

15.

Although a few courts insist that that purpose be the “sole” motivation
for the interaction, the overwhelming majority view is that it is sufficient
if that motivation is “primary” or “predominant.” Id. § 6.11.2.

16.

“Line by line” analysis could conceivably take the form of clause–by–clause
analysis, not merely sentence-by-sentence review. For instance, suppose that
after discussing a contemplated offer to buy a business, the client says to the
attorney: “Of course, I want you to keep the details of the offer—especially
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There has been little discussion of this fundamental question. The
Supreme Court has never directly addressed the question. However,
that very issue arose in a 2020 decision by the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, United States v. Ivers,17 described in
detail in Part I. Ivers was charged with making a criminal threat against
a federal judge.18 The federal judge in question had ruled against Ivers
in an earlier civil action against an insurance company.19 Ivers then
consulted two volunteer attorneys from the local pro se project to learn
whether he had a right to file a second, related suit and whether they
would represent him in the proposed second suit.20 Ivers and the two
attorneys had a thirty-minute telephone conference. 21 It was clear that
the primary purpose of the conference was to obtain the attorneys’
assessment of the legal merit of a second suit.22 During the conference,
Ivers allegedly threatened to kill the judge.23
During a subsequent prosecution for the threat, over the defense’s
attorney–client privilege objection, the presiding judge heard the attorneys’ testimony about the consultation and reviewed the notes taken
by one of the attorneys.24 After doing so, the judge decided to admit
not only evidence of the threat itself but also related angry statements
by Ivers, such as “I had overwhelming evidence” and the earlier judge
had “stacked the deck” against him.25 The Eighth Circuit did not deny
that the predominant purpose of the telephone conference related to
the rendition of legal services to Ivers.26 However, the court upheld the
trial judge’s ruling that six individual statements stating Ivers’s feelings, including the threat, were unprivileged because they did not seek

the price and my preferred closing date—confidential; but if the current
owner asks, you can tell them I’m interested.” In the first clause of the
sentence, the client has manifested an intent to maintain the confidentiality of the price and closing date discussed with the attorney. However,
in the second clause, the client has indicated that the fact of his interest
in the property need not remain confidential.
17.

967 F.3d 709, 716–17 (8th Cir. 2020), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 2727 (2021)
(mem.).

18.

Id. at 712.

19.

Id.

20.

Id. at 714.

21.

Id.

22.

Id.

23.

Id.

24.

United States v. Ivers, No. 18-cr-00090 (RWP/CFB), 2018 WL 11025541,
at 4 (D. Minn. Jun, 26, 2018) (denying motion to exclude allegedly privileged
attorney–client information).

25.

Ivers, 967 F.3d at 716.

26.

Id.
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legal advice.27 On the fundamental question of the unit of analysis, the
court held that the trial judge had the power to apply the privilege
requirements to individual statements that Ivers made during the
attorney–client consultation.28
The thesis of this short article is that in Ivers, the Court of Appeals
reached several correct conclusions about privilege doctrine but erred
in other, important respects. Part I of this article is a detailed description of the Ivers litigation at both the District Court and Court of
Appeals levels. Part II turns to the neglected question of whether the
trial judge is authorized to dissect an attorney–client exchange line by
line even when it is clear that the primary purpose of the exchange was
to obtain legal services. It argues that the Eighth Circuit correctly
concluded that trial judges possess that power. Part III then takes up
the question of when it is appropriate for trial judges to exercise that
power. Although the party opposing the privilege claim is not entitled
to in camera review as a matter of course, the judge should undertake
such a review when the party presents specific facts establishing that
the review would be more than a fishing expedition. Like Part II, Part
III concludes that on the particular facts of the case, the Eighth Circuit
reached the correct result in upholding the trial judge’s decision to
conduct a line-by-line review in Ivers.
Finally, Part IV addresses the question of whether the District
Court and Court of Appeals properly denied privilege protection on the
ground that Ivers’s statements expressing his feelings were not incident
to the attorney–client relationship. It contends that both Judge Pratt
and the Court of Appeals applied an unduly strict, legalistic conception
of the incidence requirement. Although on their face Ivers’s statements
voicing his angry feelings did not concern the merit of his legal claims,
an effective legal counselor must elicit and deal with the client’s
emotions related to the facts of the case. Part IV argues that instead of
relying on a strict incidence requirement, to vindicate the countervailing policy of protecting human life, the courts should have recognized a carefully circumscribed, categorical exception for illegal threats.
Part IV concludes that under such an exception, it was justifiable to
admit evidence of the criminal threat itself but not the testimony of
Ivers’s related, angry statements.

I. A Description of the Ivers Litigation
Although the attorney–client privilege issues arose in the criminal
case against Ivers, as the Introduction noted, the issues originated in
two civil actions. Mr. Ivers initially filed a lawsuit in Minnesota state

27.

Id. at 717.

28.

Id.
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court against a life insurance company for breach of contract.29 The case
was subsequently removed to federal court.30 The case was eventually
assigned to Judge Wilhelmina Wright of the District of Minnesota.31
Before trial, she entered an order granting summary judgement to the
defendant insurer on all but one of Ivers’s claims.32 The following
month, Mr. Ivers sent her some handwritten notes.33 The notes included
the following statements, inter alia:
• “I do not know where I am fucking sleeping tonight! Think
about it!”;
• “I want my fucking money . . . .”;
• “I am in dire fucking straits!”; and
• “I am becoming a very dangerous person!!!”34
Judge Wright forwarded the notes to the United States Marshals
Service (USMS).35 Deputy Marshal Jeffrey Hattervig met with Ivers.
Although Ivers told Hattervig that his notes were intended to speed up
the proceedings, Ivers added that if he did not receive satisfaction, “he
would ‘be a walking bomb.’”36 After his conversation with Ivers,
Hattervig arranged for increased security at the trial on Ivers’s remaining count. At the bench trial, Judge Wright entered judgment in favor
of the insurer.37
After the trial, Ivers wrote to the Chief Judge to request a new
trial.38 In his letter to the Chief Judge, Ivers asserted that Judge Wright
was biased against him.39 Ivers sent a copy of the letter to Judge
Wright.40 On that copy of the letter, he wrote: “You cheated me and I
will not stop smearing your name until I get redress.”41 Ivers also telephoned the Chief Judge’s chambers. When Ivers was informed that his
only option was to appeal, he responded that he “was not happy with

29.

Id. at 712.

30.

Id. (citing Defendant’s Motion of Removal at 1, Ivers v. CMFG Life Ins.
Co., No, 15-CV-01577, 2016 WL 5842447 (D. Minn. Sept. 30, 2016), 2015
WL 13667066.

31.

Id.

32.

Id.

33.

Id. at 712–13.

34.

Id. at 713.

35.

Id.

36.

Id.

37.

Id.

38.

Id.

39.

Id.

40.

Id.

41.

Id.
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that” and “was crazy mad.”42 Ivers then mailed additional letters,
including a letter to the Chief Judge. The letters stated that “Judge
Wright is a Corrupt! [sic] Judge.”43 Deputy Marshal Hattervig again
visited Ivers.44 Hattervig “hoped that Ivers would . . . say, okay, I
realize that I crossed the line and I won’t do it any more.”45 But Ivers
did not. Instead, Ivers again stated that he was a “walking bomb.”46 He
added that if Judge Wright was “living in fear, too fucking bad.”47
Ivers then filed a second lawsuit in federal court against the same
insurer.48 The assigned Magistrate Judge found that Ivers’s complaint
failed to state a claim for relief and referred him to the district’s Pro Se
Project to explore the possibility of filing an amended complaint. Ivers
then met with two volunteer attorneys, Anne Rondoni Tavernier and
Lora Friedemann. After the two conferred, they decided that res
judicata barred the new complaint and that they therefore would not
take Ivers’s case.49 They then scheduled a telephone call to inform Ivers
of their decision. During the first part of the approximately thirtyminute call, the attorneys explained that the new lawsuit would likely
be unsuccessful. At that point, Ivers began ranting about Judge Wright.
Friedemann made written notes of some of Ivers’s statements, including:
• “This fucking judge stole my life from me”;
• “I had overwhelming evidence”;
• “Judge ‘stacked the deck’ to make sure I lost this case”;
• “Didn’t read the fine print and missed the 30 days to seek
a new trial—and ‘she is lucky.’ I was ‘going to throw some
chairs’”; and
• “You don’t know the 50 different ways I planned to kill
her.”50
42.

Id.

43.

Id. (alteration in original).

44.

Id. at 714.

45.

Id.

46.

Id.

47.

Id.

48.

Id. (citing Defendant’s Motion of Removal at 1, Ivers v. CMFG Life Ins.
Co., No, 15-CV-01577, 2016 WL 5842447 (D. Minn. Sept. 30, 2016), 2015
WL 13667066.

49.

Id.

50.

Id. In two opinions, Judge Pratt described Ivers’s statement as including
the word “plan,” not “planned.” United States v. Ivers, No. 18-cr-00090
(RWP/CFB), 2018 WL 11025541, at *1 (D. Minn. June 26, 2018) (denying
motion to exclude allegedly privileged attorney–client information), aff'd,
967 F.3d 709 (8th Cir. 2020); United States v. Ivers, No. 18-cr-00090
(RWP/CFB), slip op. at 1 (D. Minn. Aug. 1, 2018) (denying motion to
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The attorneys did not talk while Ivers was speaking; and when he
stopped speaking, they concluded the call.51
Friedemann was frightened because she thought that Ivers had
made what she described as “a death threat against Judge Wright.”52
Consequently, after consulting an ethics advisor, the attorneys
contacted the coordinator of the Pro Se Project to inform her of the
threat. In turn, the coordinator informed Judge Wright and alerted the
Marshals.53 When deputy marshals visited Ivers, he told them to “get
the fuck out of here.”54 He said that he was “crazy fucking angry.” He
added that if Judge Wright “doesn’t sleep very good, fuck her.”55 “Ivers
was later indicted for threatening to murder a federal judge . . . .”56
A.

The Original In Limine Motion to Exclude in the
Federal District Court

Judge Robert Pratt oversaw the criminal proceedings based on the
charge of threatening Judge Wright.57 Before trial in the criminal case,
the defense filed two motions. The first was a motion to exclude any
testimony by the two attorneys about statements that Ivers made
during the thirty-minute telephone conversation.58 The motion argued
that the statements were inadmissible because they were protected by
the attorney–client privilege. Judge Pratt denied the motion.59 Before
ruling, he listened to the attorneys’ testimony and reviewed the written
notes of the conference. In his order denying the motion, Judge Pratt
emphasized that since privileges “are in derogation of the search for

clarify). Moreover, during trial testimony, both of the attorneys, Lora
Friedemann and Anne Rondoni Tavernier, were unsure about whether
Ivers had used the present tense. Transcript of Jury Trial—Volume III at
424–25, 428, 487–88, Ivers, 2018 WL 11025541. If Ivers had used the
present tense, it would be clearer that his statement was a threat to attack
Judge Wright in the future. However, in its description of the statement,
the Court of Appeals used the verb “planned” and stated that that was
the wording that Ms. Friedemann had transcribed in the notes she took
during the telephone conference. 967 F.3d at 714.
51.

Ivers, 967 F.3d at 714.

52.

Id.

53.

Id. at 715.

54.

Id.

55.

Id.

56.

Id.

57.

Id. at 712 n.1.

58.

Id. at 715.

59.

United States v. Ivers, No. 18-cr-00090 (RWP/CFB), 2018 WL 11025541, at
*5 (D. Minn. June 26, 2018) (denying motion to exclude allegedly privileged
attorney–client information), aff'd, 967 F.3d 709 (8th Cir. 2020).
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truth,” they are not “expansively construed.”60 He then announced that
he would not consider the “entire” telephone call “a single communication.”61 Rather, he focused on a smaller unit of analysis; he proceeded
to examine the various “portions” of the call.62 He stated that he would
“parse out the individual statements made during the call and determine whether each statement is privileged.”63 On the facts, he found
that certain statements by Ivers were unprivileged because they were
not incidental to the attorney–client relation; in Judge Pratt’s words,
“the threatening statements [that Ivers made during the telephone
conference] were clearly not made for the purpose of obtaining legal
advice and thus are not privileged.”64 As precedent, he cited several
district court cases finding particular portions of attorney–client
communications to be unprivileged.65 In addition, he pointed to United
60.

Id. at *2 (quoting United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710 (1974)).

61.

See id. at *2–3.

62.

Id. at *3.

63.

Id. at *2. Judge Pratt also used the verb “parse” in his later ruling clarifying the ruling on the motion to exclude. United States v. Ivers, No. 18-cr00090 (RWP/CFB), slip op. at 2 (D. Minn. Aug. 1, 2018) (denying motion
to clarify).

64.

Id.

65.

Judge Pratt stated that
numerous . . . cases . . . support the Government’s argument that
statements not made in pursuit of legal advice can be separated
from those statements that are, and the statements not made for
the purpose of seeking legal advice will not be protected by the
attorney–client privilege. See Rohlik v. I-Flow Corp., 2012 WL
1596732, *4 (E.D.N.C. 2012) (“[I]f only certain portions of withheld documents relate to legal advice, only those portions should
be withheld or redacted and the remaining portions produced.”);
F.C. Cycles Int’l, Inc. v. Fila Sport, S.p.A, 184 F.R.D. 64, 71–72
(D. Md. 1998) (examining documents paragraph by paragraph
and ordering the disclosure of those portions that related more to
business strategy than legal advice); United States v. Chevron
Corp., No. C 94-1885, 1996 WL 444597, at *2 (N.D. Cal. 1996)
(observing “the long recognized rule that the attorney–client
privilege applies to discrete communications contained within a
document,” and “[t]hus despite the overall nature of the document,
the client may assert the attorney–client privilege over isolated
sentences or paragraphs within a document”); Cuno, Inc. v. Pall
Corp., 121 F.R.D. 198, 204 (E.D.N.Y. 1988) (holding a portion of
a document was privileged where it set forth “a direction to counsel
to pursue a legal course of action [or a] legal opinion of counsel”);
Barr Marine Prods, Co., Inc. v. Borg-Warner Corp., 84 F.R.D.
631, 639–40 (E.D. Pa. 1979) (discussing “partially privileged”
attorney–client communications and holding portions of mixed
communications were privileged); Merrin Jewelry Co. v. St. Paul
Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 49 F.R.D. 54, 57 (S.D.N.Y.1970) (finding
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States v. Alexander,66 a Ninth Circuit opinion that ruled that the privilege did not apply to threats that a defendant had voiced to his courtappointed attorney.67 Further, Judge Pratt analogized to Nix v.
Whiteside,68 a case involving the ethical duty of confidentiality.69 There,
the Supreme Court held that an attorney had not rendered ineffective
assistance when he told his client that he would inform the court of the
defendant’s intention to commit perjury.70 Judge Pratt acknowledged
that Nix involved an ethical duty, not a privilege, but he nevertheless
felt that Nix lent support to his decision to hold Ivers’s threats unprivileged.71
B.

The Subsequent Motion for Clarification in the
Federal District Court

After losing the motion in limine, the defense filed a motion to
clarify the scope of Judge Pratt’s ruling on the motion in limine. More
specifically, the defense sought a pretrial order that the only statement
that would be admitted was Ivers’s reference to “fifty different ways I
plan to kill” Judge Wright.72 Judge Pratt entered a second order, denying the motion to clarify.73 The judge eventually ruled that six of Ivers’s
statements during the conference were unprivileged:
• “I had overwhelming evidence”;
• “Didn’t read the fine print and missed the 30 days to seek
a new trial”;
• “This fucking judge stole my life from me”;
• “Judge ‘stacked the deck’ to make sure I lost this case”;.
• “‘[S]he is lucky.’ I was ‘going to throw some chairs’”; and
• the alleged threat itself: “You don’t know the 50 different
ways I planned to kill her.”74
only two paragraphs of a multi-page report to be protected by the
attorney–client privilege).
United States v. Ivers, No. 18-cr-00090 (RWP/CFB), 2018 WL 11025541,
at *2 (D. Minn. June 26, 2018) (denying motion to exclude allegedly privileged attorney–client information), aff'd, 967 F.3d 709 (8th Cir. 2020).
66.

287 F.3d 811 (9th Cir. 2002).

67.

Ivers, 2018 WL 11025541, at *4 (citing Alexander, 287 F.3d at 815, 821).

68.

Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 173–74 (1986).

69.

Ivers, 2018 WL 11025541, at *4 (citing Whiteside, 475 U.S. at 173–74).

70.

Whiteside, 475 U.S. at 175–76.

71.

Ivers, 2018 WL 11025541, at *4.

72.

United States v. Ivers, No. 18-cr-00090 (RWP/CFB), slip op. at 1 (D.
Minn. Aug. 1, 2018) (denying motion to clarify).

73.

Id. at 2.

74.

United States v. Ivers, 967 F.3d 709, 714, 716 (8th Cir. 2020), cert. denied,
141 S. Ct. 2727 (2021) (mem.).
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A jury ultimately convicted Ivers, and Judge Pratt denied Iver’s
motion for acquittal or a new trial.75
C. The Decision by the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

On appeal, the Eighth Circuit upheld Judge Pratt’s ruling on the
initial in limine motion to exclude and affirmed Ivers’s conviction.76 The
Supreme Court denied Ivers’s petition for certiorari on June 7, 2021.77

II. The Threshold Policy Question:
Does the Trial Judge Have the Power to Review an
Attorney–Client Exchange Line by Line to Determine
Whether a Specific Passage Is Privileged Even When
It Is Clear that the Primary, Overall Purpose of the
Exchange Was to Obtain Legal Services?
In Ivers, it was relatively clear that the overall purpose of Ivers’s
consultation with the two attorneys was to obtain their legal evaluation
of the prospects for the second lawsuit that Ivers had filed. However,
Judge Pratt was not content to analyze the application of the attorney–
client privilege at that level of generality. Rather, he dissected Ivers’s
exchange with the attorneys and identified six individual statements
that he deemed unprivileged. The threshold question is the fundamental
issue identified in the Introduction: the unit of analysis. Does the trial
judge have the power to conduct a line-by-line78 analysis of the attorney–client exchange even when the privilege claimant establishes that
the primary purpose of the exchange was incidental to a request for
legal services? To answer that question, we shall consider the available
precedents and then address the pertinent policy considerations.
A.

The Precedents Relevant to the Question

In some cases, a privilege attaches to an entire writing or exchange
if the communication has a proper primary purpose. When a litigant
claims that a statutory privilege protects a certain type of report to the
government, such as a required accident report, the issue is one of
statutory construction.79 If the legislation uses sweeping language,
seemingly shielding all the contents of the report without suggesting

75.

United States v. Ivers, No. 18-cr-00090 (RWP/CFB), 2019 WL 78940, at
*1, *5 (D. Minn. 2019), aff'd, 967 F.3d 709.

76.

Ivers, 967 F.3d at 716–17.

77.

Ivers, 141 S. Ct. 2727.

78.

See, e.g., Story of Stuff Project v. U.S. Forest Serv., 366 F.Supp. 3d 66,
79 (D.D.C. 2019) (referring to “a page-by-page and line-by-line” review).

79.

See Imwinkelried, supra note 2, § 7.2.
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any exceptions, the language may dictate that given a proper motivating purpose, the entire report is privileged.80 Occasionally, the same
result obtains at common law. For example, there is respectable authority that when the presidential privilege attaches to a document, the
privilege extends to all the contents of the document.81 More to the
point, as the defense noted in its petition for certiorari to challenge the
Eighth Circuit’s decision, there are several attorney–client decisions
that use broad language indicating that if the privilege claimant can
satisfy the primary-purpose requirement, the privilege applies to all the
parts of an attorney–client exchange.82
However, the courts in the presidential-privilege cases may be so
emphatic about the protection of the entire document precisely because
they appreciate that that approach is atypical. In the case of most statutory and common-law privileges, appellate courts have authorized trial
judges to conduct a line-by-line analysis to determine the scope of the
privilege protection. By way of example, in the case of the medical and
psychotherapy privileges, by virtue of the patient–litigant exception,
the judge may refuse to extend privilege protection to the parts of an
otherwise privileged exchange relevant to a condition that the holder
has injected into the litigation.83 Similarly, under the dangerous-patient
exception to the psychotherapy privilege, the privilege does not apply
to a patient’s statement embodying a threat to a third party.84 In the
case of the deliberative-process privilege discussed in the Supreme
80.

See id.

81.

See Loving v. Dep’t of Def., 550 F.3d 32, 37–38 (D.C. Cir. 2008); Loving
v. U.S. Dep’t of Def., 496 F.Supp. 2d 101, 107 (D.C. Cir. 2007). However,
it must be remembered that unlike the attorney–client privilege, presidential
privilege is qualified. In its landmark decision, United States v. Nixon, 418
U.S. 683, 713 (1974), the Supreme Court ruled that a litigant may defeat
a prima facie claim of Presidential privilege by establishing a compelling,
case-specific need for the information.

82.

Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 21, Ivers, 141 S. Ct. 2727 (2021) (No.
20-7304) (first citing Alomari v. Ohio Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 626 F. App’x
558, 570 (6th Cir. 2015) (“[T]he privilege . . . covers all communications
from the June 2010 meeting because its purpose was to acquire legal
advice.” (emphasis added)); then citing In re Cnty. of Erie, 473 F.3d 413,
420–21 (2d Cir. 2007) (“The predominant purpose of a communication
cannot be ascertained by quantification or classification of one passage or
another . . . .”), vacated, 546 F.3d 222 (2d Cir. 2008); and then citing
Rush v. Columbus Mun. Sch. Dist., 234 F.3d 706, at *2 (5th Cir. 2000)
(“[T]he attorney–client privilege protects all communications during a
meeting between a school board and its attorney for the purpose of obtaining legal advice, even those communications not addressed directly to the
attorney.” (emphasis added))). The Eighth Circuit’s decision is United
States v. Ivers, 967 F.3d 709 (8th Cir. 2020), cert. denied sub nom. 141 S.
Ct. 2727 (2021) (mem.).

83.

See Imwinkelried, supra note 2, § 6.13.3.

84.

Id. § 6.13.4, (citing Cal. Evid. Code § 1024 (West 2009)).
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Court’s 2021 decision, U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service v. Sierra Club,
Inc.,85 it is well-settled that even if a government document is both
predecisional and deliberative in character, the privilege does not shield
the purely factual content of the writing.86 Tellingly, even when a writing relates to the vital national interests protected by the military- and
state-secrets privilege, the judge has the power to scrutinize the
writing’s contents and “disentangle[]” the protected portions of the
writing from the unprivileged sections.87 When a judge makes a final
ruling on the question of whether the crime/fraud exception applies to
an attorney–client exchange, the judge allows discovery of the client’s
statements related to the client’s purpose of obtaining advice to facilitate the client’s criminal or fraudulent purpose, but shields the remainder of the exchange.88 And, as Judge Pratt pointed out in his opinion,
there are numerous authorities allowing line-by-line review of documents alleged to be covered by the attorney–client privilege.89
B.

The Policy Merits of the Question

The question is whether Judge Pratt’s decision and the cases he
relied on are consistent with the policy underlying the attorney–client
privilege. There are both systemic efficiency considerations and policies
related to the rights of the individual privilege holder.
1. The Macrocosm: Systemic Considerations

At the systemic level, there are certainly cases in which it is much
more efficient for the court to focus on the higher level of generality
and limit its inquiry to whether the claimant had demonstrated that
the primary purpose of the exchange satisfied the incidence requirement.90 In the modern era of pretrial discovery of electronic data, production events can be massive:
85.

141 S. Ct. 777, 783 (2021).

86.

See Imwinkelried, supra note 2, § 7.7.2 (collecting tens of cases so holding).

87.

Id. § 8.4.4 (collecting cases).

88.

Id. § 6.13.2, (citing Dick Thornburgh, Attorney–Client Privilege
and the “Crime-Fraud” Exception: The Erosion of Business
Privacy 29 (1999) (relying on Restatement (Third) of the Law
Governing Lawyers 613–14 (The Am. L. Inst. 2000)); Paul
Matthews & Hodge M. Malek, Disclosure 240 (2d ed. 2000)
(“Where the principle applies, it does not deprive the client of all legal
professional privilege, but only that in respect to documents which are
part or in furtherance of the fraud; all other legal privilege . . . remains
unaffected.”)).

89.

See supra note 65 and accompanying text.

90.

Judge Pratt acknowledged that consideration in his order of the United
States District Court for the District Court of Minnesota denying motion
to exclude allegedly privileged attorney–client information. United States
v. Ivers, No 18-cr-00090 (RWP/CFB) 2018 WL 11025541, at *3 (D. Minn.
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Perhaps no case could be a more monumental example of the
reality of modern e-discovery than the . . . Viacom copyright
infringement lawsuit against YouTube filed back in 2008. In that
dispute, the judge ordered that 12 terabytes of data be turned
over, according to Matthew Knouff.
“People often say that one terabyte equals 50,000 trees, and
10 terabytes would be the equivalent of all the printed collections
of the Library of Congress,” says Knouff, who is general counsel
of Complete Discovery Source, a New York City-based electronic
discovery services provider. For the Viacom/YouTube case then,
the demand was for the printed equivalent of the entire Library
of Congress. And then some.91

If the party in possession of the documents asserts privilege for even
a small fraction of the documents in such a case, mandating line-byline review would impose a crushing burden on the trial court. In some
extreme cases, trial courts have resorted to sampling techniques and,
based on the analysis of a sample from the population of allegedly privileged documents, ruled on privilege claims.92
2. The Microcosm: The Legitimate Interests of the Individual
Privilege Holder

The Supreme Court has declared that the purpose of the attorney–
client privilege is to “encourage full and frank communication between
attorneys and their clients and thereby promote broader public interests
in the observance of law and administration of justice.”93 The recognition of the privilege can further those objectives in two distinct ways:
(1) encouraging clients to disclose all the relevant facts to attorneys to
enable the attorneys to provide sounder legal advice; and (2) building
trust between clients and attorneys to make the client more likely to
accept the attorney’s advice, especially advice counseling against a
contemplated course of action by the client that would entail serious
June 26, 2018), aff'd, 967 F.3d 709 (8th Cir. 2020). He noted that in some
cases “it would be difficult to comb through millions of documents to
determine whether each sentence or paragraph was protected by the
privilege.” Id. (citing Krueger v. Ameriprise Fin., Inc., Civil No. 11-2781,
2013 WL 12139425, at 16–17 (D. Minn. Aug. 15, 2013)).
91.

Joe Dysart, The Trouble with Terabytes: As Bulging Client Data Heads
for the Cloud, Law Firms Ready for a Storm, A.B.A. J., April 2011, at
33, 33.

92.

See In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 501 F. Supp. 2d 789, 790 (E.D. La.
2007), aff’d, 388 F. App’x 391 5th Cir. 2010), cert. denied sub nom. Dier
v. Merck & Co., Inc., 562 U.S. 1217 (2011) (mem.); see also Paul Trapani,
Recent Development, In re Vioxx Products Liability Litigation: Circumventing Due Process Concerns by Allowing Individualization in Sampling
Procedures, 82 Tul. L. Rev. 2517, 2522–23 (2008).

93.

Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981).
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illegality.94 As Professor Landesman has remarked, in the real world
privileged relationships such as attorney–client need “space” to promote
those objectives.95
However, Judge Pratt’s ruling reflects a somewhat narrow,
traditional view of the attorney as a gatherer of facts96—the facts that
the attorney needs to formulate sound advice for the client. This view
emphasizes that attorneys are not psychiatrists.97 The attorney supposedly ought to seek only legally salient facts98 that are devoid of emotional content.99 According to this conception of the attorney’s role, the
attorney needs to pay little or no attention to the client’s feelings, which
can get in the way of the client’s description of the facts.100 In the 1950s
and 1960s, one of the most popular television programs in the United
States was Dragnet, a series about a Los Angeles detective, Sgt. Joe
Friday, played by Jack Webb.101 Sgt. Friday is often apocryphally referenced as the origin of the phrase: “Just the facts, Ma’am.”102 An attorney subscribing to the traditional view of a client interview adopts a
similar approach.
The rub is that that view is both incomplete and outmoded. During
an interview, the attorney–client interaction103 is much more psychologically104 complex105 than the traditional view posits. The modern view
of the interview interaction is that the typical client has an overpowering need to discuss both the legally relevant facts and the accompanying

94.

See id. at 389–90, 392.

95.

Bruce M. Landesman, Confidentiality in the Lawyer-Client Relationship,
in The Good Lawyer: Lawyers’ Roles and Lawyers’ Ethics 191,
205 (David Luban ed., 1984).

96.

David A. Binder & Susan C. Price, Legal Interviewing and
Counseling: A Client-Centered Approach 25 (1977).

97.

Id. at 32.

98.

Id. at 12.

99.

Id. at 26.

100. Id. at 25.
101. Daniel Moyer & Eugene Alvarez, Just the Facts, Ma’am: The
Authorized Biography of Jack Webb 45, 55, 61 (2001).
102. Id. at 61. Curiously, Friday never spoke those precise words. He did say,
“All we know are the facts, Ma’am.” Sgt. Joe Friday Never Actually Said
“Just the Facts, Ma’am” on Dragnet, MeTV Cleveland (Jan. 17, 2020,
2:37 PM) (citing Dragnet: The Big Lease (NBC television broadcast
1953)), https://www.metv.com/stories/sgt-joe-friday-never-actually-saidjust-the-facts-maam-on-dragnet [https://perma.cc/38UJ-JLTP]).
103. Binder & Price, supra note 96, at 1.
104. Id. at 9.
105. Id. at 15.
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emotions, such as anger.106 Facts come associated with feelings.107 The
client almost always has some emotional reaction to a legally pertinent
event,108 and in many cases the client’s thoughts about the event will
be intensely emotionally charged.109 The practicing attorney is much
more than a legal technician who merely analyzes facts as if he or she
were taking a law school examination. As the American Bar Association
has emphasized, the practitioner must be a counselor who (a) advances
the client’s private interests through effective representation and (b)
promotes the public interest by persuading the client to comply with
the law.110
If the attorney does not allow the client to express those emotions
and feelings during the interview process, the client may withhold111 or
hold back112 legally relevant factual information. Denying the client that
opportunity will inhibit the flow of information between client and
attorney.113 The contemporary view is that the attorney should not
merely passively listen to the client’s statements of associated emotions.114 Rather, the attorney ought to adopt a general approach of
affirmatively encouraging such expressions.115 Doing so increases the
flow of information between client and attorney and enhances the
attorney’s ability to promote the observance of law. To begin with, if
the attorney helps the client overcome the psychological impediments
to full disclosure, the attorney is likely to obtain more information.116
Without full disclosure, the attorney may be unable to properly safeguard the individual client’s interests. Moreover, if during the interview
the client gains the sense that the attorney understands and empathizes
with the client’s feelings, the client is much more likely to be receptive
to the attorney’s advice. If at the end of the interview process the client
does not believe that the attorney understands him or her as a person,
why should the client accept the attorney’s advice, such as an urging
to fulfill his or her public duty to comply with the law?

106. Id. at 21.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 27.
110. Task Force on Att’y-Client Privilege, Am. Bar Ass’n, ABA Task
Force Recommendation for Attorney Client Privilege 1 (2005),
quoted in Imwinkelried, supra note 2 § 6.12.5.
111. Id. at 9.
112. Id.
113. See id.
114. Binder & Price, supra note 96, at 23.
115. Id. at 6–19.
116. Id. at 9.
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To implement this general approach, one of the classic modern texts
on legal interviewing, Legal Interviewing and Counseling: A ClientCentered Approach by Binder and Price, proposed the technique of
“active listening.”117 One author, David Binder, was a UCLA law professor while the other, Susan C. Price, was a clinical professor at the UCLA
Neuropsychiatric Institute. Price and Binder began to integrate modern
psychological insights into the practice of legal interviewing. The thesis
of their seminal work was that to facilitate the client–attorney interaction,118 during the interview the attorney ought to make statements
reflecting that he or she understands not only the facts the client is
relating but also the accompanying emotions and feelings.119 After the
attorney convinces the client that the attorney has that dual understanding, the attorney is in a much better position to perform the
private and public roles promoted by the attorney–client privilege. 120
To begin with, this approach better enables the attorney to perform
his or her private role advancing the individual client’s interests. Again,
Professors Price and Binder argue that when the attorney employs this
technique, the attorney must encourage the client to voice his or her
feelings about the legal topic.121 Without such encouragement, the client
will likely make only partial disclosure.122 Price and Binder frankly
acknowledge that with such encouragement, the client may make
statements such as: He or she was angry,123 the opposing litigant is “a
double-crosser” or a “bastard,” and the client would like “to punch him
out”124—statements strikingly similar to most of the statements that
the trial judge admitted in Ivers.125 Even though the typical listener
might find such statements upsetting, Price and Binder contend that
the attorney must go the length of encouraging the client to make such
statements by making reflective comments such as “I imagine you were
very angry . . . .”126 and I can understand that that made you “really
furious.”127 The client’s anger may be blocking full disclosure. Until the
client unburdens himself or herself in this manner and the attorney
reflects an understanding of the client’s emotions, the client may
117. Id. at 25–37.
118. Id. at 6, 14, 19, 20, 25.
119. Id. at 15, 25.
120. Id. at 15, 25, 35, 36.
121. Id. at 15, 25.
122. Id. at 15, 25, 36.
123. Id. at 13, 22.
124. Id. at 22.
125. See supra text accompanying note 50.
126. Binder & Price, supra note 96, at 25, 27, 30.
127. Id. at 31.
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withhold from the attorney salient facts that the attorney desperately
needs to give the client sound legal advice.128
This approach also increases the attorney’s ability to fulfill his or
her public role. Reflective statements by an attorney are nonjudgmental in nature129 but manifest an empathetic understanding back
to the client.130 On the one hand, they are non-committal131 in the sense
that if the client threatens to act out illegal conduct132 such as punching
the opposing litigant,133 the attorney stops short of saying that he or
she condones the act.134 On the other hand, it is imperative that the
attorney grant the client permission to voice the feelings associated with
the legally relevant facts.135 After inviting the client to do so, the
attorney can often ride out136 the outpouring of emotion by the client.137
The attorney can promote the observance of the law only if the attorney
realizes the emotions that may tempt the client to violate the law. In
many cases after the client has the emotional release of venting his or
her feelings, the emotions recede.138 If the attorney remains calm and
convinces the client that the attorney understands the feelings the client
is experiencing, the attorney will often be in a position to help the client
regain emotional composure;139 and at that point, the attorney can help
the client realize the need to control the emotions and perform their
duty to observe the law.
In this light, an opponent of line-by-line review might argue that it
is a mistake to empower trial judges to dissect attorney–client
exchanges as Judge Pratt did and, more specifically, to characterize
particular angry-client statements as unprivileged because they do not
seek legal advice. The argument would run that in the main, it best
effectuates the policies underlying the privilege to limit the judge’s
inquiry to the primary, overall purpose of the exchange. The prospect
of atomistic, line-by-line review may deter attorneys from employing
active listening and encouraging clients to express the emotions that

128. Id. at 35, 36.
129. Id. at 15, 25.
130. Id. at 14–16, 20–21, 25, 28.
131. Id. at 24.
132. Id. at 34.
133. Id. at 22.
134. Id. at 34, 35.
135. Id. at 13.
136. Id. at 35.
137. Id. at 34.
138. Id. at 35.
139. Id.
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the attorney needs to identify to properly advance the client’s individual interests and promote the public interest in compliance with the
law; the attorney will be afraid that by utilizing active listening, the
attorney may be creating evidence against their client. According to
this line of argument, if the privilege claimant can persuade the judge
that the predominant purpose of the consultation was to obtain legal
services, the judge’s inquiry should end; and the judge ought to refrain
from a line-by-line dissection of the attorney–client exchange.
C.

The Resolution of the Threshold Question

On the threshold question, Ivers reaches the right result,
empowering trial judges on at least some occasions to engage in
exacting, line-by-line review. It is true that in rare cases, the number
of allegedly privileged documents might be so large that line-by-line
review of the documents or a detailed review of the oral attorney–client
exchanges is impractical. However, in the typical case judicial efficiency
concerns will not completely preclude in-depth review.
Nor should policy concerns about the individual privilege holder’s
rights invariably bar line-by-line review. As we shall see in Part III,
those concerns can largely be allayed by making line-by-line review the
exception rather than the rule and identifying an appropriate trigger
for such review. In the run-of-the-mill case in which the holder can
satisfy the primary purpose requirement and there are no facts raising
questions about the legitimacy of the statements exchanged in the
attorney–client interaction, the opponent should not be entitled to
demand that the judge conduct a line-by-line review. Confining line-byline review to exceptional fact situations, as recommended by Part III,
provides considerable “space” for frank attorney–client exchanges that
touch on the client’s relevant feelings as well as the facts in the client’s
possession; and specifying the types of extraordinary circumstances
warranting such review can add another measure of protection. If judges
can engage in detailed review of the contents of documents containing
military and state secrets that implicate the nation’s safety and
survival, it is difficult to justify automatically foreclosing in-depth view
of attorney–client exchanges.

III. The Next Policy Question:
When Is It Appropriate for the Trial Judge to
Exercise the Power to Engage in Line-by-Line Review
of the Contents of Otherwise Privileged Document or
a Similar Review of Oral Attorney–Client Exchanges?
Assume that as a matter of policy, the judge should be accorded
the power to conduct a line-by-line review of either an allegedly privileged letter or oral exchange between attorney and client. The next
question that arises is when it is appropriate for the judge to exercise
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that power. Distinguish between situations in which the judge has discretion to do so and those in which the opponent has a right to have
the judge do so.
A.

Review in the Trial Judge’s Discretion

In the situations we are discussing, a litigant claims to be a privilege
holder and contends that he or she has established a prima facie case
for invoking the attorney–client privilege. The validity of the claim
turns on a number of preliminary or foundational facts. Federal Rules
104(a)–(b) prescribe the procedures for determining preliminary facts
conditioning the admissibility of evidence. In pertinent part, those
provisions read:
(a) In General. The court must decide any preliminary
question about whether a witness is qualified, a privilege exists,
or evidence is admissible. In so deciding, the court is not bound
by evidence rules, except those on privilege.
(b) Relevance That Depends on a Fact. When the
relevance of evidence depends on whether a fact exists, proof must
be introduced sufficient to support a finding that the fact does
exist.140

The Conditional Relevance Procedure Under Rule 104(b). It is
often said that the judge uses the 104(a) procedure to determine the
competence of an item of evidence while he or she resorts to the 104(b)
procedure to decide the conditional relevance of evidence.141 Initially,
consider Rule 104(b). Under Rule 104(b), “the judge plays a limited,
screening role . . . . The judge must accept the [proponent’s foundational] testimony at face value . . . .”142 The judge inquires only
whether, if believed by the jury, the testimony has sufficient probative
value to support a logical, permissive inference of the preliminary fact.143
Federal Rule of Evidence 602 applies this procedure to the preliminary
question of whether a lay witness possesses personal knowledge of the
fact he or she proposes testifying to,144 and Rule 901(a) extends the
same procedure to the preliminary question of the authenticity of an
exhibit such as a letter.145 If on its face the foundational testimony
possesses adequate probative worth to support such an inference, the
140. Fed. R. Evid. 104.
141. 1 Edward J. Imwinkelried, Paul C. Giannelli, Francis A.
Gilligan, Fredric I. Lederer & Liesa Richter, Courtroom
Criminal Evidence §§ 133–34 (6th ed. 2016).
142. McCormick on Evidence, supra note 12, § 53, at 440–43.
143. Id.
144. Fed. R. Evid. 602.
145. Fed. R. Evid. 901.
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judge admits the proffered item of evidence; and, if the opponent
disputes the witness’s personal knowledge or the exhibit’s authenticity,
the judge instructs the jury to decide the question after considering
both sides’ evidence.146
Why does Rule 104(b) limit the judge’s scrutiny and reserve the
final decision to the jury? Suppose that after considering both sides’
evidence, the jury decides that a lay witness does not have personal
knowledge of a traffic accident; the witness is either lying or confused.
Once the jury decides that the witness “doesn’t know what he’s talking
about,” common sense will naturally lead the jury to disregard the
witness’s testimony during deliberations.147 Alternatively, assume that
after considering both sides’ evidence, the jury decides that the proffered letter is a forgery. Once the jury decides that the exhibit “isn’t
worth the paper it’s written on,” again common sense will prompt them
to disregard the exhibit.148 It is not just that the lay jurors are competent to decide whether a witness saw an event or whether an asserted
author wrote a letter. More importantly, we can trust the jury to make
that determination without calling into question the integrity of the
jury’s deliberations.149 After deciding at a conscious level that the
witness lacks personal knowledge or that the exhibit is inauthentic, the
jury will put the proffered evidence out of mind; the jury’s exposure to
the evidence and the related foundational testimony will not distort
their deliberations.150 These facts condition the relevance of the evidence
in such a fundamental sense that even a lay juror lacking any legal
training can appreciate that if the witness lacked personal knowledge
or the writing is a forgery, the evidence has absolutely no bearing on
the decision in the case. Consequently, Rule 104(b) restricts the trial
judge’s inquiry and assigns the real decision to the jury.
The Competence Procedure under Rule 104(a). Contrast Rule
104(a), the competence procedure.151 This procedure controls when, for
example, an accused objects that certain testimony is inadmissible as
privileged. The text of Rule 104(a) expressly states that that provision
governs the decision whether “a privilege exists.”152 Suppose that the
evidence in question is a third party’s testimony that in a large elevator
she heard the accused admit to his attorney that he, the accused, had
in fact raped a young child. Would it be safe to apply the Rule 104(b)
procedure and allow the jury to make the ultimate determination
146. McCormick on Evidence, supra note 12, § 53, at 445–47.
147. Id. at 447.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 440–41.
152. Fed. R. Evid. 104(a).
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whether there was sufficient physical privacy that the accused had a
reasonable belief that his conversation with the defense attorney was
confidential? Even if at a conscious level the jury decided that the belief
was reasonable and the testimony therefore technically privileged, could
we trust the jury to put the testimony out of mind during the balance
of their deliberations? Realistically, at a subconscious level some jurors
would be unable to perform that mental gymnastic, and others might
be unwilling to do so.153 Consequently, Rule 104(a) assigns the final
decision on the facts conditioning privilege objections to the judge.
The significance of that conclusion is that unlike a judge applying
Rule 104(b), a judge applying Rule 104(a) can pass on the credibility
of the foundational testimony.154 In the words of the Advisory Committee Note to Rule 104(a), “the judge acts as a trier of fact.”155 While
under Rule 104(b) the trial judge considers only the proponent’s foundational testimony, under 104(a) the judge considers both sides’ testimony before ruling; that difference explains why a litigant has a right
to conduct voir dire in support of a Rule 104(a) objection.156 The judge
needs to be able to listen to both sides’ foundational testimony before
resolving a preliminary question falling under Rule 104(a). Having done
so, the judge can resolve any credibility question and make a plenary
fact finding.157
Assume that in a case such as Ivers, while the accused asserts the
attorney–client privilege, the prosecution argues that an element of the
prima facie case, such as confidentiality or incidence, is missing or that
an exception applies. The defense counsel submits foundational testimony in support of the privilege objection; as in Ivers, the defense
presents testimony that the primary purpose of the consultation in
question was to obtain legal services.158 However, since 104(a) governs,
the prosecution may dispute the defense testimony; and the trial judge
need not accept the defense testimony at face value. It follows that to
resolve the credibility question, the trial judge should be empowered to
conduct an in camera, line-by-line review of any written or oral foundational testimony. The upshot is that under Rule 104(a), the judge has
the discretion to conduct such a review whenever the judge has a bona
fide doubt about the truth or truthfulness of the testimony supporting

153. McCormick on Evidence, supra note 12, § 53, at 440–43.
154. Id.
155. Fed. R. Evid. 104(a) note (Advisory Committee on Proposed Rules).
156. McCormick on Evidence, supra note 12, § 53, at 440–43.
157. Id.
158. United States v. Ivers, 967 F.3d 709, 715 (8th Cir. 2020), cert. denied, 141
S. Ct. 2727 (2021) (mem.).
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the privilege objection.159 Unlike Rule 104(b), Rule 104(a) does not compel the judge to credit the supporting testimony; in his or her discretion,
the judge can go beyond the proffered foundational testimony to
examine the allegedly privileged communication itself.160
B.

The Opposing Party’s Entitlement to a Review

Under 104(a), the party opposing a privilege objection can invoke
the judge’s discretion and request that the judge review the allegedly
privileged material.161 However, are there any situations in which the
party is entitled to have the judge conduct a line-by-line review? The
point of agreement is that to establish such a right, it is not enough for
the party to speculate that a line-by-line review might reveal that some
of the contents of the material are unprivileged.162
An analogous question arises under the crime/fraud exception to
the attorney–client privilege. As the Supreme Court explained in its
1989 decision, United States v. Zolin,163 a party contending that the
crime/fraud exception renders certain material unprivileged sometimes
has a right to have the judge review the material in camera before ruling
on the privilege objection.164 However, the Court did not make in
camera review available as a matter of course. Rather, the Court held
that the party opposing the privilege claim must present sufficient facts
to support a good-faith belief that in camera examination “may yield”
facts establishing the applicability of the exception.165 Admittedly, that
standard is “very relaxed.”166 However, the party resisting the privilege
claim cannot rely on sheer conjecture; the party must present some
facts to trigger the right to in camera review.167
The courts could adopt a parallel approach to deciding whether the
privilege opponent is entitled to have the judge engage in a line-by-line
review of the allegedly privileged material. By way of example, assume
159. McCormick on Evidence, supra note 12, §53, at 443.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 440–43.
162. Rock River Commc’ns v. Universal Music Corp., 730 F.3d 1060, 1069–70
(9th Cir. 2013), amended, reh’g en banc denied, 745 F.3d 343 (9th Cir.
2014).
163. 491 U.S. 554 (1989).
164. Id. at 564.
165. Imwinkelried, supra note 2, § 6.13.2. See Bethany Lipman, Invoking the
Crime Fraud Exception: Why Courts Should Heighten the Standard in
Criminal Cases, 52 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 5905, 614 (2015).
166. United States v. Gorski, 807 F.3d 451, 460 n.3 (1st Cir. 2015) (quoting In
re Grand Jury Proceedings, 417 F.3d 18, 22 (1st Cir. 2005)).
167. Geraldine Gauthier, Dangerous Liaisons: Attorney–Client Privilege, the
Crime-Fraud Exception, ABA Model Rule 1.6 and Post-September 11
Counter-Terrorism Measures, 68 Brook. L. Rev. 351, 360 (2002).

894

Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 72·Issue 4·2022
Parsing Privilege

that a litigant makes an attorney–client privilege objection to a
consultation between the litigant–client and an attorney. The litigant
testifies that he or she consulted the attorney to obtain some legal
advice. To be protected by the privilege, the communication must occur
incident to the protected relationship; the client must consult the
attorney qua attorney rather than in some other capacity,168 such as
accountant.169 Suppose that the party opposing the objection presents
testimony that: The attorney in question is also an accountant; the
attorney devotes most of her professional time to her accountancy
practice; and the consultation in question occurred a few days before
the April 15 deadline for filing income taxes. Given those facts, the
party opposing the objection has a plausible argument that in camera
review may reveal that at least part of the consultation was devoted to
non-legal matters and therefore unprivileged.
At the end of Part II, we concluded that in Ivers, the Court of
Appeals correctly concluded that a trial judge has the power to conduct
a line-by-line review of allegedly privileged material. But did the court
err in deciding that Ivers was an appropriate fact situation in which to
exercise that power? There is a strong argument that here, too, the
court reached the right result. In Ivers, the prosecution claimed that in
camera review of the oral exchange between Ivers and the two attorneys
would reveal threatening language, directed at Judge Wright.170 That
claim was hardly sheer speculation. Before Ivers’s consultation with the
two attorneys,
• after Judge Wright initially granted summary judgment to
the insurer on all but one of Ivers’s claims, he sent her a
note stating “I am becoming a very dangerous person!!!”;
• when the United States Marshals Service (USMS) later
visited him, he showed no remorse for his statements about
Judge Wright and added that he was “a walking bomb”;
• after Judge Wright ruled against him at the trial on his last
claim, he wrote to Judge Wright to state that “[y]ou
cheated me” and to the Chief Judge to add that he was a
“crazy mad” “walking bomb”;
• when the USMS revisited Ivers after the trial, Ivers said
that he was a “ticking time bomb” and that if Judge Wright
was “living in fear, too fucking bad”; and
• when the USMS revisited him again shortly after his
consultation with the two attorneys, Ivers called Judge
Wright “‘that fucking judge who stole’ his life” and added

168. Imwinkelried, supra note 2, § 6.11.1.
169. United States v. Bisanti, 414 F.3d 168, 172 (1st Cir. 2005).
170. United States v. Ivers, 967 F.3d 709, 714 (8th Cir. 2020), cert. denied, 141
S. Ct. 2727 (2021) (mem.).
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that the deputies could report that he remained “crazy
fucking angry.”171
The telephone consultation in question concerned the very same
litigation that all of Ivers’s other statements related to. By presenting
evidence of the language that Ivers used repeatedly both before and
after the consultation, the government established that it was not
requesting that the judge launch a mere fishing expedition. Rather, the
evidence demonstrated an ample basis for a good-faith belief that the
review would reveal unprivileged evidence supporting a threat prosecution, if not an actionable threat.

IV. The Final Policy Question:
In Conducting an In Camera Review in Cases Involving
Threats, Should the Judge Apply a Strict Incidence
Requirement to Decide Whether the Client’s
Language Is Unprivileged, or Is It Preferable to
Adopt a Categorical Exception Limited to Criminal
Threats?
Part II concluded that in Ivers, the Court of Appeals correctly
found that the unit of privilege analysis is the individual statement and
that trial judges have the power to conduct line-by-line reviews of allegedly privileged material even when the primary purpose of the overall
attorney–client exchange was to obtain legal services. Next, Part III
concluded that the court also reached the right outcome in deciding
that on the facts in Ivers, the government’s evidence of Ivers’s conduct
before and after the consultation made it appropriate for the judge to
engage in a detailed review of the contents of Ivers’s exchange with the
two attorneys. However, those two conclusions do not end the analysis.
The remaining question is what standards the judge should use in
conducting the review to decide whether individual statements by the
client are privileged.
A.

The Approach Taken by Judge Pratt and the Eighth Circuit:
The Strict Application of the Incidence Requirement

In their opinions, both Judge Pratt and the Court of Appeals relied
on the incidence requirement as the justification for holding that the
six statements that Ivers made during the telephone conference and
that were admitted into evidence at trial were unprivileged.
In his opinion on the original defense motion to exclude, Judge
Pratt stated:
[T]he Court concludes that because the alleged angry and threatening statements Defendant made to Attorney A on February 27
were not “made for the purpose of facilitating the rendition of
171. Id. at 713–15.
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legal services to” Defendant, the statements are not protected by
the attorney–client privilege.172

The judge used essentially the same language in his order on the
clarification motion:
The Court noted Attorney A had testified that Defendant made
angry and threatening statements during their February 27 phone
call that did not relate to the purpose of the call, which was to
obtain legal advice in a pending civil action, but that instead were
directed toward a certain federal judge. The Court held that
because the alleged angry and threatening statements “were not
‘made for the purpose of facilitating the rendition of legal services
to’ Defendant, the statements are not protected by the attorney–
client privilege.”173

Similarly, the Court of Appeals relied on the incidence requirement
as the premise for its decision:
Ivers’s statements . . . were in no way necessary to further his
civil lawsuit or made in order to obtain guidance in filing an
amended complaint. For these reasons, it is clear that the statements at issue were not for the purpose of obtaining legal advice
about his pending lawsuit against an insurance company and are
not protected by the attorney–client privilege.174

The court’s use of the adjective “necessary” is telling. The court is
certainly correct that strictly speaking, Ivers did not need to make his
threatening statements in order to obtain the attorneys’ advice during
the telephone conference. Moreover, since privileges obstruct the search
for truth, most courts balk at construing the scope of privileges
expansively; that policy bias cuts in favor of rigorous enforcement of
the incidence requirement.175 Nevertheless, the two courts’ opinions reflect a narrow, legalistic conception of the incidence requirement. Given
Binder and Price’s insights, courts should adopt a broader view of the
172. United States v. Ivers, No. 18-cr-00090 (RWP/CFB), 2018 WL 11025541,
at *4 (D. Minn. June 26, 2018) (quoting United States v. Horvath, 731 F.2d
557, 561 (8th Cir. 1984)) (denying motion to exclude allegedly privileged
attorney–client information), aff'd, 967 F.3d 709 (8th Cir. 2020).
173. United States v. Ivers, No. 18-cr-00090 (RWP/CFB), slip op. at 2 (D. Minn.
Aug. 1, 2018) (quoting Ivers, 2018 WL 11025541, at *4) (denying motion
to clarify).
174. Ivers, 967 F.3d at 714.
175. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d 910, 918 (8th
Cir. 1997) (stating that “[p]rivileges . . . ‘are not lightly created nor
expansively construed, for they are in derogation of the search for truth’”)
(quoting United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710 (1974)); Ivers, 967
F.3d at 716; Ivers, 2018 WL 11025541, at *4.
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requirement to both facilitate the client’s willingness to disclose facts
to the attorney and enhance the client’s receptivity to the attorney’s
advice, including advice to observe the law. For an attorney and a client
to form an effective working relationship—one in which the client
discloses all the facts in his or her possession and develops enough trust
in the attorney to take the attorney’s advice seriously—the attorney
and client need “space” in their interactions.176 In the client’s mind,
facts are often associated with feelings; and before the client feels
comfortable enough with the attorney to candidly reveal all the facts—
good, bad, and indifferent—the client may have to unburden by voicing
the associated feelings, including and sometimes especially feelings of
anger.177 It is true that as a matter of strict logic, the client’s feelings
are not necessarily tied to the facts; but there can be a very real psychological tie.178 The unexpressed feelings may be a huge impediment to
the client’s full, frank disclosure of facts that are highly relevant in a
legal sense.
Moreover, although the attorney need not endorse the client’s
negative feelings,179 to be receptive to the attorney’s advice, the client
must sense that the attorney at least has an empathetic understanding
of the feelings.180 Without that sense, the client may be unwilling to
accept even the attorney’s perfectly sound legal advice or the attorney’s
admonition to refrain from illegal conduct. Until the client gets the
negative emotions “off his[ or ]her chest,” they might refuse to listen to
reason.181 In most cases, the attorney should encourage the client’s
outpouring of related feelings;182 after the attorney rides out the client’s
expression of emotion,183 the attorney can frequently help the client
regain composure.184 However, until the client is allowed to vent his or
her related feelings, the client may not be in a frame of mind to listen
carefully to the attorney’s advice. The modern, psychologically sound
view of the attorney–client relation is that without the trust that can
be built only by dealing with the client’s emotions, the attorney cannot
effectively advance either the private or public interests that the
attorney–client privilege is intended to promote.185
176. Bruce M. Landesman, Confidentiality and the Lawyer-Client Relationship,
Utah L. Rev. 765, 783, 786 (1980).
177. Binder & Price, supra note 96, at 15, 21–23, 30.
178. Id. at 15, 21–23, 30.
179. Id. at 31 (“non-judgmental”).
180. Id. at 14–15.
181. Id. at 35.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 36.
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As Part I pointed out, at trial Judge Pratt admitted six statements
that Ivers made during the telephone conference with the two attorneys.186 Consider several of the statements:
• At the trial in the first lawsuit, “I had overwhelming
evidence.”187 To be sure, this statement expressed Ivers’s
frustration. However, any attorney counseling Ivers about
the viability of the second lawsuit would want to hear that
statement. If Ivers is going to eventually accept the attorney’s advice to abandon the second lawsuit, the attorney
needs to be in a position to explain to Ivers why he did not
have the right type of evidence or why even his seemingly
“overwhelming” evidence fell short of satisfying the legal
burden of proof. A client who believes that they lost despite
“overwhelming evidence” is not going to be inclined to readily accept an attorney’s advice to terminate the litigation.
• “Judge ‘stacked the deck’ to make sure that I lost the
case.”188 If Ivers voices that feeling to the attorney, the
attorney can follow up by asking how in particular Ivers
believes that the judge acted unfairly. The attorney can
then explain why the specific judicial acts and rulings that
Ivers found troublesome were defensible applications of
accepted legal rules and practices. However, if the client
does not express this sentiment to the attorney and does
not receive that explanation, the client may be left with the
impression that the outcome at the trial in the first lawsuit
was a blatant miscarriage of justice. A client harboring such
an impression is much less likely to follow the attorney’s
advice to abandon the litigation.
• Ivers did not “read the fine print and missed the 30 days
to seek a new trial.”189 The relatively short thirty-day
period may strike a layperson as a minor, procedural technicality. But any attorney counseling Ivers needs to understand Ivers’s view of the filing period. If Ivers does not voice
his anger about the short filing period, Ivers’s attorney is
not in a position to explain to him that his untimely filing
absolutely forecloses a second lawsuit. However, once the
client has vented by expressing that anger and the attorney
provides the necessary explanation, a calmer client may appreciate that it is a waste of time, money, and emotion to
pursue the litigation further.

186. See supra text accompanying note 50.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id.
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Did the attorneys need to hear any of these expressions of Ivers’s
anger to formulate their advice to him that he should abandon the
second lawsuit? The answer to that question is “No.” In a legalistic
sense, those statements were not incident to the attorneys’ performance
of the legal service of providing advice about the viability about the
second lawsuit. Even without the benefit of those statements, the
attorneys could have formulated the basic advice that they ultimately
gave Ivers.
However, again, the attorney–client privilege is intended to foster
both clients’ private interest in obtaining accurate advice and the public
interest in promoting compliance with the law.190 If Ivers’s attorneys
are going to convince him to abandon the second lawsuit and end the
waste of valuable public judicial resources, they need to hear those
statements. At the end of the telephone conference, the attorneys essentially invited Ivers to express his feelings about the litigation,191 and to
some degree his statements were responsive to the invitation to voice
the emotions that the attorneys needed to learn to serve as effective
counselors. If the attorneys allow those statements to go unsaid and
permit Ivers to continue to harbor presumably unwarranted grievances
about the prior proceedings, the attorneys may be unable to promote
the public interest that the privilege is intended to advance. The
bottom line is that if we posit a broader incidence standard reflecting
the contemporary understanding of the psychological dynamics of
attorney–client interactions, at least some of the District Court’s rulings
would be erroneous.
B. An Alternative Approach: The Recognition of a Categorical
Exception for Criminal Threats Stated During Attorney–Client
Consultations

As Subpart A explained, both Judge Pratt and the Court of
Appeals conceptualized the issue in Ivers as the question of whether
Ivers’s statements were incident to his attorney–client relationship with
the two lawyers he spoke with; Judge Pratt and the Court of Appeals
denied privilege protection for the stated reason that Ivers had not
established an element of the prima facie case for a privilege claim, that
is, the satisfaction of the incidence requirement.192 However, another
190. See supra text accompanying notes 93–139.
191. Transcript of Jury Trial—Volume III, supra note 50, at 451 (“At that
point I had made the determination that I would kind of let him speak,
you know, wanting to make sure that he had felt like his—like he had been
heard, that we could have a chance to explain, you know, what he thought
had occurred, you know, despite what we had decided from a legal standpoint, to kind of just have that conversation and allow him to speak. So
I mostly let him speak unhindered.”).
192. United States v. Ivers, 967 F.3d 709, 712 & n.1, 716–17 (8th Cir. 2020),
cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 2727 (2021) (mem.).
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approach is possible. As previously stated, even when a litigant can
establish a prima facie case for a privilege claim, the opponent seeking
disclosure of the communication can prevail by demonstrating a waiver
by the holder or the applicability of an exception to the scope of the
privilege. It is submitted that in cases such as Ivers, it is far preferable
for the courts to apply a categorical exception for criminal threats than
examine the facts through the lens of the incidence requirement.
It is appropriate to recognize an exception when three factors
concur.
First, the fact situation implicates a contrary “countervailing”
policy; the court does not deny privilege protection because the general
policies underlying the privilege are inapplicable but rather because the
facts trigger another extrinsic policy that comes into conflict with those
policies. For example, while the courts ordinarily are extremely protective of psychotherapy confidentiality,193 many jurisdictions require therapists to report child abuse even when the therapist has learned about
the abuse only through otherwise protected communication with a patient.194 In these situations, all of the elements of a prima facie case for
asserting the privilege are present; but the enforcement of the privilege
is at odds with the policy of protecting innocent children from abuse.
Second, the countervailing policy is a weighty one. The policies
underpinning evidentiary privileges are both legitimate and substantial;
to protect those policies, the courts are willing to invoke privileges even
when doing so leads to the end result of suppressing relevant, reliable
evidence that would be useful to the trier of fact.195 To trump those
policies, the countervailing interest must be a very important one, such
as the protection of innocent children or, in the case of the dangerouspatient exception to the psychotherapy privilege,196 preventing impaired
patients from injuring themselves or third parties.197
Third, ideally the scope of the exception can be formulated in clear,
bright line terms. In his famous discussion of the criteria for recognizing
privileges, Dean Wigmore argued that privilege rules, including exceptions to the scope of privileges,198 must be stated in those terms.199 He
feared that laypersons such as clients would be reluctant to consult with

193. Imwinkelried, supra note 2, § 6.2.7(b).
194. Id. § 6.13.2(c).
195. Id. § 6.2.7(a).
196. Id. § 6.13.4(b).
197. Cal. Evid. Code § 1024 (West 2009); People v. Cordova, 358 P.3d 518,
547 (Cal. 2015), cert. denied, 578 U.S. 926 (2016) (mem.); Ewing v.
Goldstein, 15 Cal. Rptr. 3d 864, 872 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004).
198. Steven R. Smith, Constitutional Privacy in Psychotherapy, 49 Geo.
Wash. L. Rev. 1, 48 (1989).
199. Imwinkelried, supra note 2, § 3.2.3.
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and confide in professionals such as attorneys if they could not be assured that their communications would be protected from later
compelled judicial disclosure.200 The available empirical studies of the
impact of privileges strongly suggest that Wigmore’s fear was overstated.201 However, the overwhelming majority of courts, including the
United States Supreme Court, still concur with Wigmore and stress the
need to state privilege rules in carefully articulated terms. In Swidler &
Berlin202 in 1998, the majority declared that “uncertain privileges are
disfavored.”203 Even more emphatically, in Upjohn Co. v. United
States,204 the Court asserted that the client “must be able to predict
with some degree of certainty whether particular discussions will be
protected. An uncertain privilege, or one which [merely] purports to be
certain . . . , is little better than no privilege at all.”205
As we shall now see, all three of these factors cut in favor of recognizing a carefully circumscribed, categorical exception to the attorney–
client privilege for client statements that amount to criminal threats to
commit acts that will cause serious personal injury to or the death of a
third party.
1.

The Countervailing Nature of the Interest

Although both Judge Pratt and the Court of Appeals couched the
dispositive question in Ivers in terms of a formal element of the prima
facie case for a privilege claim—that is, the incidence requirement206—
the real stakes in Ivers are obvious. Neither Judge Pratt nor the Court
of Appeals denied that the primary purpose of Ivers’s consultation with
the two attorneys was to obtain their legal advice about the viability
200. See generally Melanie B. Leslie, The Costs of Confidentiality and the
Purpose of Privilege, 2000 Wis. L. Rev. 31, 49 (2000).
201. Imwinkelried, supra note 2, § 5.2.2 (collecting the studies of the attorney–
client and psychotherapist–patient privileges); Edward Imwinkelried,
Questioning the Behavioral Assumption Underlying Wigmorean Absolutism in the Law of Evidentiary Privileges, 65 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 145 (2004);
Edward J. Imwinkelried, A Psychological Critique of the Assumptions
Underlying the Law of Evidentiary Privileges: Insights from the Literature
on Self-Disclosure, 38 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 707 (2004); Edward Imwinkelried,
The Rivalry Between Truth and Privilege: The Weakness of the Supreme
Court’s Instrumental Reasoning in Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1 (1996),
49 Hastings L.J. 969 (1998). Simply put, in the typical layperson’s mind,
the world may not revolve around the courtroom to the extent that Dean
Wigmore assumed.
202. 524 U.S. 399 (1998).
203. Id. at 402.
204. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 393 (1981).
205. Id.; see also Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 18 (1996) (quoting Upjohn,
449 U.S. at 393).
206. See United States v. Ivers, 967 F.3d 709, 719–20 (8th Cir. 2020), cert.
denied, 141 S. Ct. 2727 (2021) (mem.).
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of his second lawsuit against the insurance company.207 Even if that
purpose did not motivate all of Ivers’s statements during the telephone
conference, the consultation itself undeniably implicated the core
legitimate policies that justify the recognition of the attorney–client
privilege.
On the facts, though, those policies were pitted against the policy
of preventing threatened injuries or killings. This is the very same type
of conflict that has led so many jurisdictions to recognized true exceptions from the psychotherapy privilege for reports of child abuse208 and
patient statements indicating that the patient has become a danger to
himself or herself or innocent third parties.209 Rather than leaving it to
individual judges to force disclosure of such statements on an ad hoc
basis by applying the incidence requirement, these jurisdictions concluded that the appropriate approach was the enunciation of a fullfledged exception to the scope of the privilege.210 Realistically, in their
opinions, Judge Pratt and the Court of Appeals were not so much
attempting to set a new standard for rigorous enforcement of the
incidence requirement; rather, ultimately, they were attempting to
vindicate the preeminent interest in safeguarding innocent human life.
Framing a categorical exception for criminal threats is a much more
reliable and straightforward method of upholding that interest.
2.

The Magnitude of the Interest

As so many areas of law reflect, that interest is certainly a
considerable one. To begin with, that interest underpins the decision to
make certain types of threats to cause injury or death a crime. Again,
the charge in Ivers was threatening to murder a federal judge.211 Tort
law is in accord. In its celebrated Tarasoff decision,212 the California
Supreme Court ruled that the psychotherapy privilege did not preclude
imposing on the therapist a duty to warn when his or her patient makes
a credible threat against an identified third party.213 Similarly, the rules
207. Id. at 714.
208. Imwinkelried, supra note 2, § 6.13.2(c).
209. Id. § 6.13.4(b).
210. Id.
211. Ivers, 967 F.3d at 712; 18 U.S.C. § 115(a)(1)(B). Ivers was also charged
with interstate transmission of a threat to injure the person of another, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 875(c). Ivers, 967 F.3d at 712.
212. Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 347 (1976).
213. Id.; see also Alan R. Felthous & Claudia Kachigian, The Fin de Millénaire
Duty to Warn or Protect, 46 J. Forensic Sci. 1103, 1111 (2001); George
C. Harris, The Dangerous Patient Exception to the Psychotherapist–
Patient Privilege: The Tarasoff Duty and the Jaffee Footnote, 74 Wash.
L. Rev. 33, 34 (1999); Elisia Klinka, Note, It’s Been a Privilege: Advising
Patients of the Tarasoff Duty and Its Legal Consequences for the Federal
Psychotherapist–Patient Privilege, 78 Fordham L. Rev. 863, 903 (2009).
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of legal ethics reflect that this interest can trump the client’s interest
in the protection of the confidentiality of his or her communications
with their attorney. ABA Model Rule of Professional Conduct 1.6(b)(1)
provides: “A lawyer may reveal information relating to the
representation of a client to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes
necessary . . . to prevent reasonably certain death or substantial bodily
harm . . . .”214 In justifying the provision, the official Comment does not
argue that a client’s statements threatening assault or killing can never
be deemed incident to the attorney–client relationship; instead, the
Comment appeals to “the overriding value of life and physical
integrity.”215 For that matter, some jurisdictions have gone to the length
of recognizing full-fledged comparable privilege exceptions. By way of
example, California Evidence Code § 1024 codifies a dangerous-patient
exception to the psychotherapy privilege;216 and the same code creates
a similar exception to the attorney–client privilege.217 Even without the
benefit of legislation, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals concluded
that in that jurisdiction, the attorney–client privilege must yield when
there is “a reasonable possibility of the occurrence of a continuing or
future crime likely to result in serious bodily injury or death.”218
If anything, the case for recognizing a categorical exception for
client statements amounting to illegal threats is stronger than the case
for the well-settled crime/fraud exception to the attorney–client
privilege. By virtue of the latter exception, the privilege does not attach
to the client’s statements seeking advice that will enable the client to
facilitate an ongoing or future crime or fraud.219 However, unless the
client goes further and solicits the attorney’s involvement in the crime

214. Model Rules of Prof. Conduct r. 1.6(b)(1) (Am. Bar Ass’n 2020).
215. Id. at cmt. 6. In its opinion, the Court of Appeals pointed to the corresponding
provision of the Minnesota Rules of Professional Conduct. United States
v. Ivers, 967 F.3d at 716 n. 2.
216. Cal. Evid. Code § 1024 (West 2009) reads:
There is no privilege under this article if the psychotherapist has
reasonable cause to believe that the patient is in such mental or
emotional condition as to be dangerous to himself or to the person
or property of another and that disclosure of the communication is
necessary to prevent the threatened danger.
217. Id. § 956.5:
There is no privilege under this article if the lawyer reasonably
believes that disclosure of any confidential communication relating
to representation of a client is necessary to prevent a criminal act
that the lawyer reasonably believes is likely to result in the death
of, or substantial bodily harm to, an individual.
218. Henderson v. State, 962 S.W.2d 544, 557 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997), cert.
denied, 525 U.S. 978 (1998) (mem.).
219. McCormick on Evidence, supra note 12, § 95.

904

Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 72·Issue 4·2022
Parsing Privilege

or fraud, the client’s statement itself does not amount to a crime.220
Furthermore, in the case of fraud, the interest protected by the
exception is usually monetary in nature.221 In contrast, by its terms this
exception can be restricted to statements that constitute criminal
threats; and even then the exception can be limited to situations in
which the threat is of serious bodily injury or death. In both respects,
the case for an exception for threats is more compelling.
3.

A Carefully Circumscribed Exception Stated in Bright-Line Terms

The final question is the scope and phrasing of the exception. As
previously stated, in Ivers Judge Pratt not only admitted evidence of
the alleged threat: “You don’t know the 50 different ways I planned to
kill her.” He also allowed the prosecution to introduce testimony about
Ivers’s statements that “I had overwhelming evidence,” the “[j]udge
stacked the deck” against him, and the “judge stole my life from me.”222
While those statements are disturbing and disrespectful, none of them
amounted to an illegal threat. Binder and Price take the position that
during a consultation, the attorney should not only permit but also
invite the client to express angry feelings about the case.223 An expression of generalized frustration, anger at the outcome, or even anger
at the judge falls far short of an illegal threat or criminal conduct.
It is true that another of Ivers’s statements was that “‘she is lucky.’
I was ‘going to throw some chairs.’”224 That statement is closer to the
line. However, on its face that statement threatens only a disruption of
the proceeding or at most property damage. In their discussion of
allowing the client to vent in order to build up the necessary attorney–
client trust, Price and Binder contend that it is even useful for an angry
client to vent by telling the attorney that he, the client, wants to
“punch . . . out” the opposing litigant225—an act that could result in
personal injury. Again, though, the Model Rule of Professional Conduct
permits the attorney to disclose only when the client threatens “reasonably certain death or substantial bodily harm.”226 For that matter, in
the minority of jurisdictions that have already carved out an analogous
exception to the attorney–client privilege by statute or case law, the

220. Model Rules of Prof. Conduct r. 1.2(d) (Am. Bar Ass’n 2020).
221. Restatement (Third) Torts § 9 cmt. a (Am. L. Inst. 2020).
222. United States v. Ivers, 967 F.3d 709, 714 (8th Cir. 2020), cert. denied, 141
S. Ct. 2727 (2021) (mem.).
223. Binder & Price, supra note 96, at 22–23, 27, 30–31, 35.
224. Ivers, 967 F.3d at 714.
225. Binder & Price, supra note 96, at 22.
226. Model Rules of Prof. Conduct r. 1.6(b)(1) (Am. Bar Ass’n 2020).
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exception is restricted to threats of “serious”227 or “substantial”228 bodily
injury.
When the exception is cabined in that manner, the strength of the
countervailing interest is at its zenith, it is far easier for the attorney
to know when to alert the client that the client is about to go over the
brink, and during any in camera examination it will be much less difficult for the trial judge to identify the statements that do not deserve
privilege protection. Ivers’s threatening reference to “50 different
ways . . . to kill her” was his only statement that directly implicated
the policy of protecting innocent human life.229 Given a bright line standard, a judge could readily single out that statement out as a threat.
Moreover, an attorney could more readily sense that a client’s outburst
was escalating to the point that the client was about to cross the line
and preemptively both warn and remonstrate with the client.

CONCLUSION
Reflecting back on Ivers, it probably would not have affected the
outcome if the court had conceptualized the issue as an exception
problem rather than an exercise in applying the incidence requirement.
Suppose that Judge Pratt had excluded the other five statements and
admitted only Iver’s statement about the “50 different ways . . . to kill
her.”230 The prosecution did not need the testimony about the other five
statements Ivers made during the telephone conference to prove that
Ivers’s threat was serious. As the Court of Appeals’ decision recites, the
prosecution had other evidence that:
• The month after Judge Wright entered her order granting
the insurer summary judgment on all but one of Ivers’s
claims, Ivers sent Judge Wright a note that “I am becoming
a very dangerous person!!!”;
• After a bench trial was scheduled on the remaining count,
Ivers sent the court a letter, demanding a jury trial and
stating “I smell a rat!”;
• When the USMS visited him before the trial, he described
himself as “a walking bomb”;
• After the trial, in a letter to the Chief Judge, Ivers wrote
that “I was cheated by one of your federal judges”;
• In a call to the Chief Judge’s chambers, Ivers stated that
he was a “crazy mad” “walking bomb”;

227. Henderson v. State, 962 S.W.2d 544, 556 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997), cert.
denied, 525 U.S. 978 (1998) (mem.).
228. Cal. Evid. Code § 956.5 (West 2009).
229. Ivers, 967 F.3d at 714.
230. Id.
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•

A few days later, he sent out another round of letters
asserting that Judge Wright was “[c]orrupt”;
• When the USMS once again visited Ivers, he refused to retract his prior statements, used the phrase “walking bomb,”
and commented that if Judge Wright was “living in fear,
too fucking bad”; and
• When the USMS contacted Ivers after his telephone conference with the attorneys, he ranted about Judge Wright,
said he was “crazy fucking angry,” and added that if Judge
Wright “doesn’t sleep very good, fuck her.”231
For that matter, there is a strong argument that so long as they
did not reveal the substantive content of Ivers’s other statements during
the consultation,232 based on their perception of Ivers’s tone of voice
during the consultation under Rule 701, the attorneys could have given
lay opinion testimony that Ivers appeared to be very angry.233
It is true that the prosecution could have used Ivers’s other statements during the telephone consultation as more immediate context for
interpreting the “fifty ways to kill her” statement as a genuine threat.
However, even if Judge Pratt had excluded testimony about the other
five statements, the defense would have been hard pressed to convince
the jury that Ivers made the “fifty ways to kill her” remark in jest. In
all likelihood, the jury would have convicted even if they had not heard
testimony about the five statements; and applying this circumscribed
exception, the appellate court would have found no error in admitting
the “fifty ways” threat.
Looking forward after Ivers, recognizing a limited, categorical exception for criminal threats is a preferable method of approaching fact
situations such as Ivers’s case. The proposed exception rests on a strong,
countervailing interest. In their opinions, Judge Pratt and the Court of
Appeals took a strict, very legalistic approach to the application of the
incidence requirement to attorney–client consultations. However, we
231. Id. at 712–15.
232 Imwinkelried, supra note 2, § 6.7.1.
233. McCormick on Evidence, supra note 12, § 11; 1 Imwinkelried et al.,
supra note 141, § 1401 (describing the admissibility of lay opinion testimony
about a person’s emotional state); People v. Smith, 347 P.3d 530, 551
(Cal. 2015) (noting that based on his or her perception of a person, a
witness may “describe [the person’s] behavior as being consistent with a
state of mind” (quoting People v. Chatman, 133 P.3d 534, 572 (2006)).
Although the record does not indicate that there was an opinion objection,
at trial Ms. Friedemann testified that during the consultation, Ivers was
“very angry” and in a “rage.” Transcript of Jury Trial—Volume II at 379–
80, United States v. Ivers, No. 18-cr-00090 (RWP/CFB), 2018 WL
11025541 (D. Minn. June 26, 2018) (denying motion to exclude allegedly
privileged attorney–client information), aff'd, 967 F.3d 709 (8th Cir. 2020).
Similarly, Ms. Rondini Tavernier testified that Ivers had engaged in “an
angry rant.” Transcript of Jury Trial—Volume III, supra note 50, at 451.
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should not encourage attorneys to interview their clients the way
Sergeant Joe Friday questioned witnesses on Dragnet: Just give me the
legally relevant facts and forego the messy associated emotions. As
Price and Binder have shown, as a counselor an attorney cannot be
blind to the client’s associated feelings, even negative feelings of
anger.234 If the attorney does not encourage the client to voice those
feelings, the pent-up feelings may impede the attorney’s effort to obtain
all the relevant facts and advance the client’s private interests by
providing fully informed advice. Moreover, if the attorney fails to do
so, the attorney and client may never develop the trust necessary to
persuade the client to be receptive to the attorney’s advice, especially
advice that serves the public interest by urging the client to comply
with the law.235 As previously stated, a competent practitioner has to
be a counselor, not a mere legal technician.236 To be an effective counselor, the attorney must be attuned to the psychological dynamics of
interactions with his or her client.237 A legalistic application of the incidence requirements can make it hazardous for the attorney to do so.238
In sharp contrast, sculpting a carefully circumscribed, bright line exception for criminal threats will afford the latitude that both a sensitive
attorney and a troubled client need.

234. See supra text accompanying notes 117–39.
235. See supra text accompanying notes 176–83.
236. See supra text accompanying note 110.
237. Binder & Price, supra note 96, at 9.
238. See supra text accompanying notes 172–91.
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